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The Cosmopolitan Tradition: A Noble but Flawed Ideal. By Martha C. Nussbaum.
(Harvard University Press, 2019. Pp. 309. Price $27.95. ISBN 9780674052499.)
Because it provides a useful framework for thinking about specific duties across
national boundaries and global justice, cosmopolitanism has many adherents
and considerable influence in the field of global ethics. Martha Nussbaum’s
latest contribution is commendable for its scholarly detail in tracing the his-
torical lineage of the cosmopolitan tradition while identifying the origins of its
shortcomings. Though Nussbaum provides a rich discussion of historical texts
and philosophical issues that would appeal to the specialist, her writing is clear
and accessible to general audiences, and the book would be appropriate for
an upper-division undergraduate seminar.
Cosmopolitanism is the ‘moral idea’ that ‘dignity is non-hierarchical’
(p. 2); that human beings have equal and unconditional worth because, and this
is the germ of the philosophical failing for Nussbaum, of our capacity for moral
choice. Characteristics endowed either by nature or society, as well as those of
non-human animals, are irrelevant from a moral point of view, as are external
goods such as wealth, status, class, and the like. This noble idea, however, is
flawed because it introduces the problem that we have yet to overcome—that
‘the dignity of moral capacity is complete in itself ’ in that material goods
are unimportant for human flourishing (p. 5). Consequently, cosmopolitanism
introduces a bifurcation of duties—duties of respect and duties of material
aid—but holds that only duties of respect matter. This flaw—that human dig-
nity is immune from the vicissitudes of fortune—allows us to evade duties of
material aid. The remainder of the book sets out to trace this flaw through a
selected history of Western moral philosophy (Cicero, the Stoics, Grotius, and
Smith) and argue that its persistence to this day can be overcome by impor-
tant modifications to cosmopolitan theories based on Nussbaum’s Capabilities
Approach (CA).
Nussbaum lays blame for the bifurcation of justice at the foot of Cicero but
does so through a critical account that aims to rehabilitate certain aspects of
his view. It was Cicero, under the influence of Stoic philosophy’s dismissive
attitude towards external goods, who introduced the distinction between duties
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of justice and duties of material aid and the asymmetrical idea that duties of
justice are strict and universal, while those of material aid allow for some
discretion on the part of the agent in terms of when and to whom such
duties are binding—an asymmetry that is the origin of modern philosophy’s
distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. But it was also Cicero’s
recognition that some differential consideration can be given to family, kin,
and nation when it comes to duties of material aid because of morally relevant
features of ‘gratitude, need and dependency, and thick association’ (p. 33).
Nussbaum identifies two problems with the Stoic/Ciceronian view, which
she further develops in Chapter 3. First, the Stoics’ dismissal of external goods
as accidental and unnecessary for moral goodness of the soul is inconsistent
with their justification for the asymmetry of the two notions of duties. If the
Stoic ideal is complete mastery of one’s passions and freedom of the soul,
then why should slavery or abuse be any more an affront to human dignity
than poverty or low social class? Rather than follow the Stoic to this logical
conclusion, however, Nussbaum advocates for the decidedly more Aristotelian
view that both physical and mental abuse, as well as material impoverishment,
are an affront to human dignity because a minimum standard of both material
and emotional well-being are required for eudaimonia. The second problem
Nussbaum identifies strikes at the heart of Stoic cosmopolitanism. The Stoics
eschewed external goods also due to their belief that any attachment to exter-
nals would lead to attachment to personal relations, to unstable passions, and
to moral partiality. Thus, Stoics deny that externals are necessary for flourish-
ing also because one cannot have particular attachments and respect the value
and dignity of all humans. For Nussbaum, this poses a deep problem for cos-
mopolitanism because external goods are necessary even for duties of justice
given that internal capabilities constitutive of human dignity require nurturing
and external support to develop. If the Stoics are right about the dangers of
particular passions and attachments—even to family—then the external goods
that Nussbaum thinks are necessary at the same time block our ability to have
sufficient detachment to satisfy cosmopolitan ethical demands. To overcome
this dilemma requires a reconceptualization of both cosmopolitanism and our
emotional relationship between particular attachments and love of humanity,
which Cicero has achieved, according to Nussbaum.
In what is an insightful, thorough, and penetrating chapter (Chapter 5),
Nussbaum lays bare how these two contrasting strands of thought—the Ci-
ceronian allowance for special duties to family and fellow citizens and the
Stoic emphasis on detachment from our passions—are articulated by Adam
Smith in complex yet ultimately unsatisfying ways. But more interestingly and
importantly for Nussbaum, Smith is the first to argue in The Wealth of Nations
that duties of justice entail duties of aid in a way that lays fertile ground for the
CA. Duties of justice alone are insufficient for protecting the dignity of persons
because differences in habit, education, and legal and economic arrangements
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/pq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/pq/pqz069/5613952 by Kresge Law
 Library user on 23 January 2020
BOOK REVIEW 3
have an impact on these core capacities and ultimately distort the conditions
of exchange. To be fully human requires that these capabilities be trained and
developed, which suggests that duties of material aid are as important as duties
of justice, a position that Nussbaum further develops in Chapter 7.
In the last two chapters, Nussbaum identifies and discusses five significant
philosophical and ethical problems associated with cosmopolitan and offers
prescriptions for overcoming these deficiencies that transition cosmopolitanism
to Nussbaum’s preferred CA, some of which might be familiar to communitar-
ian critics of cosmopolitanism. The first addresses limitations to cosmopolitan
moral psychology, especially the Stoics’ difficulty in motivating individuals to
care about global justice given their skepticism of particular attachments. Sec-
ondly, cosmopolitanism’s emphasis on a single, overarching normative view
excludes from consideration any fidelity to religion or similar traditions within
the public sphere. Thirdly,Nussbaum rejects the Stoic-cosmopolitan tradition’s
emphasis on international law both because of the absence of satisfactory en-
forcement mechanisms but also due to the Grotius’s (Chapter 4) commitment
to national sovereignty as a normative principle. Fourthly, the concentration
of aid funneled through powerful and largely unaccountable international
non-governmental organisations undermines national sovereignty and is inef-
fectual at best and harmful at worst. Finally, her improvement upon Grotius’
views on asylum and migration has particular salience given the global chal-
lenges today and provides useful principles for adjudicating among competing
concerns while justifying moral condemnation of current policies, especially
guest-worker programs, liberal deportation policies, and selective asylumbased
on ethnicity or religion.
In making a compelling case that the cosmopolitan tradition is a noble but
flawed ideal, Nussbaumengages the reader through her usual careful, scholarly
analysis of important historical texts that would be beneficial to those interested
in the history of philosophy and to those seeking a nuanced understanding
of cosmopolitanism. Certainly, some might object that her analysis represents
only one version of cosmopolitanism, a point she anticipates in her criticism
that ‘the term “cosmopolitanism” is now too vague to be useful’ (p. 209),
but part of her project is to isolate through historical analysis those salient
aspects that provide the tradition with unity. Her argument might have been
strengthened as well by acknowledging existing critiques of cosmopolitanism
outside the CA, but for those who are interested in justifying a global ethic
freed from the constraints of cosmopolitanism, Nussbaum’s latest contribution
will serve as a rich and valuable resource.
University of Notre Dame Warren J. von Eschenbach
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